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prescribe within certain specified terms, by invoking the rule
quae temporalia the same actions may be urged in defense in cer-
tain cases after the prescriptive period has lapsed. The correct
method of pleading the rule is in an exception, but the courts
have consistently permitted it to be brought by means of recon-
ventional demand. W. F. M. M., JR.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SALE AND CONTRACT TO SELL DISTIN-
GUIsHED--Plaintiff contracted to sell bags to be used in the de-
fendant's sugar mill. Defendant failed to furnish the requisite
shipping instructions, rendering it impossible for plaintiff to de-
liver the bags. Therafter defendant discontinued its business op-
erations. Plaintiff, although the bags had not been supplied, sued
for the full purchase price. The defendant filed an exception of no
cause of action and, in the alternative, prayed that the plaintiff
be directed to redraft his petition in such a manner as to allege
the amount of damages actually suffered. The trial court's action
in overruling the exception and entering judgment for the plain-
tiff for the purchase price was affirmed on appeal, the defendant's
right to demand delivery of the sacks being specifically reserved
in the judgment. Mente & Company, Incorporated v. Roane Sug-
ars, Incorporated, 199 La. 686, 6 So. (2d) 731 (1942).'
A judgment for specific performance requires performance of
the contract as agreed.2 Ordinarily equity specifically enforces a
contract only when it regards the recovery of damages for its
breach an inadequate remedy.2 Throughout the course of devel-
opment of the doctrine 4 it is quite apparent that specific perform-
1. The court attempted to distinguish the instant case from the early case
of Mente & Co., Inc. v. Judice Co., Inc., 159 La. 183, 105 So. 283 (1925), involv-
ing a similar set of facts where an exception of no cause of action was sus-
tained. This earlier court held that the vendor should have first shipped the
bags before bringing its action. The basis upon which the court distinguishes
the two cases is that the contract involved in the instant case contained a
stipulation not found in the contract of the earlier case whereby the vendee
obligated himself to furnish the vendor with shipping instructions.
2. Throckmorton, Eaton on Equity (2 ed. 1923) 488, § 262.
3. McClintock, Equity (1936) 92, § 58; Pomeroy, Specific Performance of
Contracts (3 ed. 1926) 130, § 47; Throckmorton, op. cit. supra note 2, at 489, §
489; Walsh, Equity (1930) 299, § 58; Arts. 1926, 1927, La. Civil Code of 1870;
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R., 44 La. Ann. 64, 10 So. 401
(1892); Solomon v. Dienthal, 46 La. Ann. 897, 15 So. 183 (1894); Caddo Oil &
Mining Co. v. Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914); Fite v. Miller,
192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939) (noted in (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198]
196 La. 876, 200 So. 285 (1941).
4. "In Roman law, the manus iniecto, the pignoris capio, and the missio,
the overburdened indemnity for damages (as far as the quadruplum), the
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ance is not demandable as a matter of right but is left entirely to
what is termed the "judicial discretion" of the courts.' In such
cases where specific performance is sought the plaintiff must al-
lege and prove that he was willing and able to perform his part
of the obligation. This is based on the equitable maxim that "he
who seeks equity must do equity."6 Even though the breach of a
contract may not be adequately compensated in damages,7 specific
performance will not be awarded if such performance is imprac-
ticable,' impossible,9 or involves an obligation to render personal
services.1 0
condemnation to infamy (in certain cases), the power of the magistrate of
jurisdictionem defendere poenali judicio (this reminds us of the English Con-
tempt of court), and the practice recommended by Justinian of the stipu-
latio poenae, seems to an efficacious means of indirect compulsion extant even
before the last period of the development of Roman law when the direct exe-
cution was carried out manu militari." De Rossi, Historical and Comparative
Notes on the First Origin of Specific Performance (1936) 48 The Juridical Re-
view 129, 130.
5. 2 The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Contracts
(1932) § 359, sets out the discretionary character of the remedy. Factors
which are to be considered in the exercise of this discretion are the uncer-
tainty in the amount of the injury, the unconscionableness of the contract,
the hardship of enforcement in proportion to the need for relief, and the ex-
tent of the public interest, all requiring a keen insight into human nature
and the problem of life itself. See footnote in Comment (1933) 11 Neb. L.B.
319, 320, for the courts' interpretation of "judicial discretion." For further
discussions of judicial discretion see Burke, Judicial Discretion (1920) 90
Cent. L. J. 355; Isaacs, The Limits of Judicial Discretion (1923) 32 Yale L. J.
339, 346, 351; Note (1930) 65 A.L.R. 8. The Louisiana court recognizes the dis-
cretionary nature of this right. Solomon v. Dienthal, 46 La. Ann. 897, 15 So.
183 (1894); Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012 (1911); Tri-State Transit
Co. v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 181 La. 779, 160 So. 411 (1935). The leading case in
the United States Supreme Court for this point is the early case of Hennessy
v. Woolworth, 128 U.S. 438 (1888).
6. Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1017 (1920); New Orleans Polo Club
v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 128 La. 1044, 55 So. 668 (1911); Snyder v. Wilder,
146 La. 811, 84 So. 104 (1920); Seiger v. Seiger, 169 La. 611, 125 So. 732 (1930).
7. As to a contract for the sale of immovable property, there is no ques-
tion as to the right of either the vendor's or the vendee's enforcing specific
performance of such contract since damages in such a situation would clearly
be inadequate. McClintock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 92, § 58; Walsh, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 303, § 59. Art. 2462, La. Civil Code of 1870, gives this rule:
"A promise to sell, when there exists a reciprocal consent of both parties as
to the thing, the price and the terms, and which, if it relates to immovables,
is in writing, so far amounts to a sale, as to give either party the right to en-
force specific performance of same." (Italics supplied.)
8. McClintock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 99, § 59; Walsh, op. cit. supra note
3, at 322-340, § 64-67. Specific performance will not be allowed where one of
the obligations to be performed is the appointing of an arbitrator. Mirandona
v. Burg, 49 La. Ann. 656, 21 So. 723 (1897); Gauche v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co.,
125 La. 530, 51 So. 578 (1910); Saint v. Martel, 127 La. 73, 53 So. 422 (1910);
Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012 (1911); Longno v. Webb Press Co.,
132 La. 25, 60 So. 707 (1913); Walsh, op. cit. supra, at 322, § 64. Where en-
forcement of the contract would require continued supervision by the court
and would require personal services by both parties which neither could be
compelled to perform, specific performance will be denied. Synder v. Wilder,
146 La. 811, 84 So. 104 (1920); Lone Star Salt Co. v. Texas S.L.R., 99 Tex. 445,
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The problem in contracts for the sale of movables resolves it-
self into a determination as to whether the transaction is a "sale"
or a contract "to sell." Article 2456 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides that title of the subject matter of the sale passes to the
vendee as soon as the property has been designated and the price
agreed upon, even though there has not yet been a delivery or
payment of the price.1 It therefore follows that if title in the
goods has passed, then the vendor has the right to sue the vendee
for the price of the thing sold,12 and the vendee should have an ac-
tion to recover the article. An alternative remedy is to sue for the
dissolution of the sale, 3 with damages.14 Where the contract covers
goods, the price of which is to be determined by weighing or
measuring, title does not pass until such weighing or measuring.15
However, Article 2462 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that if
the parties have reciprocally agreed on the thing, the price, and
the terms, then either party has the right to enforce specific per-
90 S.W. 863, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 835 (1906). The continued supervision by the
court required for the performing of an obligation to drill an oil well is suf-
ficient basis for a denial of specific performance. Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v.
Producer's Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914); Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229,
187 So. 650 (1939) [noted in (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198], 196 La. 876,
200 So. 285 (1941).
9. McClintock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 99, § 60; Caperton v. Forrey, 49 La.
Ann. 872, 21 So. 600 (1897).
10. McClintock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 101, § 61; Walsh, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 335, § 66; Snyder v. Wilder, 146 La. 811, 84 So. 104 (1920).
11. "The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties, and the
property Is of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as
soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof,
although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid." Art. 2456,
La. Civil Code of 1870.
The Louisiana courts have not been so much troubled in making a de-
termination of the effects of a contract to sell as in their efforts to distinguish
a, completed sale from a contract to sell. The rule appears to be that the
parties must clearly intend that title shall pass immediately in order that the
contract may constitute a sale; otherwise it will be treated as a contract to
sell. Smith v. Hussy, 119 La. 32, 43 So. 902 (1907); Noto v. Blasco, 198 So. 429
(La. App. 1940). See Comment, The Effect of Article 2462 of the Louisiana
Civil Code (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 629, for an adequate treatment of
this problem.
12. Art. 2549, La. Civil Code of 1870; Mente & Co., Inc. v. Roane Sugars
Inc., 6 So. (2d) 731 (La. 1942) (reserving to the vendee the right to compel
delivery of the thing sold).
13. As long as the sale remains in force, title remains in the vendee. The
Code clearly and without ambiguity provides that a dissolution of a sale can
be effected only through the medium of the courts and cannot take place by
virtue of the will of one of the parties. Arts. 2046, 2047, 2561, La. Civil Code
of 1870.
14. Art. 2555, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Art. 2458, La. Civil Code of 1870. This article has also been interpreted
to mean that where a definite mass of matter has been sold, by weight or
measure, In which the total quantity is unknown, there is no passage of title
until the mass has been weighed or measured. Kohler v. Huth Constr. Co.,
168 La. 827, 123 So. 588 (1929), noted In (1929) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 149.
1942] NOTES
formance of the agreement. ' This article contemplates, undoubt-
edly, an agreement as to a certain or specific thing, in which case,
the agreement would amount to a "sale." Nevertheless, the Lou-
isiana courts in most cases have not undertaken to determine
whether or not the contract is a "sale" or a "contract to sell," but
have treated such contracts as completed sales thus making the
vendee liable for the purchase price. At the same time the vendor
is permitted to sell the article on the open market and recover the
difference from the vendee. 1'7 The inconsistency'thus suggested is
explainable on the theory that, in reality, the vendor is acting as
the agent of the vendee.' This is borne out by the rule that when
the subject matter of the sale is perishable there may be a duty
on the vendor to sell the commodity, as the creditor must use
every possible means to minimize his own loss and that of the
debtor.' 9
At common law a like distinction seems to be made between
sales and contracts to sell. In the former, an action to recover
either the price or the thing sold may be maintained, but the
weight of authority denies specific performance where the agree-
16. The writer in Comment (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 629, 639, con-
cludes that there is no valid reason for a different treatment under the article
as to contracts to sell movable and contracts to sell immovables.
17. Bartley v. City of New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 264 (1878); Woodstock
Iron Works v. Standard Pulley Mfg. Co., 115 La. 829, 40 So. 236 (1905); H. T.
Cottam & Co. v. Moises, 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916 (1921); Leon Godchaux Cloth-
ing Co. v. De Bourg, 10 La. App. 635, 120 So. 539 (1929), noted in (1929) 4
Tulane L. Rev. 147; Mutual Rice Co. of La. v. Star Bottling Works, 163 La.
159, 111 So. 661 (1927); Burrus Mull & Elevator Co. v. Eunice Grain Co., 182
La. 475, 162 So. 48 (1935). By the breach of the contract the vendor becomes
the trustee of the purchaser, the negotarium gestor, to dispose of the mer-
chandise in good faith and reasonable diligence even at private sale, public
auction not being absolutely required. White v. Kearny, 2 La. Ann. 639
(1847); H. T. Cottam & Co. v. Moises, supra. But see Benton v. Bidault & Co.,
6 La. Ann. 30 (1851). However, if the one who buys the goods even at public
auction is really acting for the vendee as agent, such sale is not valid In
determining the market price of the article and the vendor forfeits his right
to damages. Judd Linseed Oil Co. v. Kearney, 14 La. Ann. 352 (1859).
18. The writer in Comment (1929) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 92, 104 concludes that
as a matter of policy the position which the Louisiana court takes in permit-
ting such resale is commendable but states that "the soundness of principle
does not justify a deviation from the Code."
19. Leon Godchaux Clothing Co. v. De Buys, 10 La. App. 635, 120 So. 539
(1929), noted in (1929) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 147. The court, however, in this case
as well as in the instant case fails to determine as to whether or not there is
a completed sale or a contract to sell. The vendee will not be permitted to
demand the performance of a contract after an unreasonable delay and in
the face of an advancing or declining market, as such recovery is speculative
and not within the intention of the parties at the date of the signing of the
contract. J. H. Garrison & Son v. Sherill Hardware Lbr. Co., 156 La. 147, 100
So. 253 (1924); Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. McCowan, 180 La. 174, 156
So. 213 (1934); Burrus Mill & Elevator Co. v. Eunice Grain Co., 182 La. 475,
162 So. 48 (1935). See Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 279.
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ment is a contract to sell.20 Under the Uniform Sales Act, which
has been adopted by the majority of other jurisdictions, the same
rules apply. Section 63 (1) of the act provides for a specific action
for the price when title has passed. .Under Section 64 (1) of the
act the vendor is limited to an action for damages where title to
the goods has not passed to the vendee.
21
Less confusion should result in such cases if the court would
first determine whether or not the contract involves a completed
sale or a contract to sell. If the court should find that the contract
constitutes a completed sale, title to the goods having then passed
to the vendee, a judgment for the purchase price would be in
order, and likewise the vendee would be entitled to recover the
thing sold. If, however, title to the goods has not passed, the judg-
ment given should await damages only and not recovery of the
purchase price. Since there had been no passing of title in the
instant case, the judgment rendered seems erroneous.
G.R.J.
20. Malcomson v. Reeves Pulley Co., 93 C.C.A. 339, 167 Fed. 939 (1909);
John Deere Plow Co. v. Gorman, 9 Kans. App. 675, 59 Pac. 177 (1899); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Cheney, 21 Ky. 550, 51 S.W. 813 (1899); Moody v. Brown, 34 Me.
107 (1852); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Balfany, 78 Minn. 370, 81
N.W. 10, 79 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1899); Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255,
61 S.E. 235, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 807n (1908).
21. This has been the interpretation placed upon Section 64 by the courts.
Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934). The amount of damages that
the vendor is entitled to is the amount of difference between the contract
price and the then current market price. In re Independent Distillers of
Kentucky, 34 F. Supp. 708 (D.C. Ky. 1940).
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